Japan’s security policy is of central concern to understanding the international relations of Asia, and has been the object of fascination and fierce contestation in the postwar period. The history of prewar militarism and disastrous defeat in the Pacific War, culminating in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the US-led Occupation and demilitarization of Japan, and the introduction of Article 9—the “peace clause” of the Constitution—have combined to ensure that any discussion of Japanese security policy remains highly controversial domestically, regionally, and internationally. Japan’s choices regarding the development of its security policy have been of concern to neighboring East Asian states fearful of Japanese revanchism. Such choices have also been of crucial interest to the United States, Japan’s principal security partner; the United States seeks to boost Japanese support for the US-led bilateral security alliance system (see also chapter 38), which is intended to preserve the existing balance of power in the region. Finally, Japan’s security debates have attracted considerable academic interest, with IR theorists puzzled by Japan’s apparent pursuit of a constrained security policy uncharacteristic of many other advanced industrial powers.

The purpose of this chapter is to integrate and make sense of these debates in order to present an analysis of the principal drivers and overall trajectory of Japan’s security policy. To undertake this exercise, the chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part provides an overview of the main theoretical and policy debates that have framed our understanding of the development of Japan’s security policy, specifically: the mix of international and domestic political factors in dictating policy shifts; the degree of and resistance to any shifts toward a more assertive military stance for Japan; and assessments of the impact of Japan’s security policy on regional and global stability. The second part engages in and tests these three central debates through an examination of the evolution of Japanese security policy from the postwar period through to the contemporary period. It begins by elucidating Japan’s Grand Strategy and its distinctive military and nontraditional approaches to security in the postwar period.
to provide a baseline from which to judge the extent of change in security policy. It then examines the contemporary regional and global security challenges that have generated external pressures for change—including particular sets of security relations with key states in Northeast and Southeast Asia—as well as the domestic policymaking actors, institutions, and societal attitudes that mediate these external pressures. The third part of the chapter assesses concomitant changes in Japan’s national security doctrines and military capabilities and the development of cooperation pursuant to the US-Japan alliance, which provide further empirical proof of the degree and direction of travel in Japan’s security stance, especially with regard to military versus nonmilitary conceptions of security.

In line with this analysis, the third part of the chapter makes a number of arguments concerning the development of Japan’s security that challenge many of the dominant positions in the three key debates outlined above. First of all, it postulates that Japan’s security policy is—contrary to the position of certain theorists and policymakers—most definitely experiencing an ever strengthening and significant trajectory of change, if still in cautious incremental stages. Japan is moving toward a more assertive military role in defending its own territory, in conjunction with the United States in projecting military power externally, and much of this policy impetus comes at the expense of more nontraditional conceptions of security. Moreover, in contrast to those who argue that Japan’s security policy will remain largely constrained by domestic factors, the evidence suggests that international pressures from neighboring East Asian states and the alliance with the United States are now gaining the upper hand in pushing Japan along this more assertive and militarized security trajectory as a major player in East Asia. The conclusion is that Japan’s development of military security has new and possibly unpredictable ramifications for regional and global security. Japan is likely to move closer toward security collisions with China and other neighbors, and its ability to manage cooperation and tensions within the US-Japan alliance will influence US attempts to maintain security in East Asia and beyond.

19.1. Debating Japan’s Security Directions

Three key debates have framed our understanding of Japan’s security policies. The first, of both theoretical and policy relevance, concerns the key drivers behind the development of Japan’s security policy, and the relative weight of international versus domestic variables in determining policy (Soeya 1998). In effect, it reveals the contestation between scholars of realist and constructivist persuasions (see chapters 2 and 4 respectively).

Neorealist analysis asserts that Japan will be increasingly cajoled by the deteriorating international security environment to convert its economic strength into military
strength, and to aspire to great power status, even through the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Japan’s principal reason for maintaining its anomalous international status as a relatively demilitarized nation in the postwar period has been its reliance on US hegemony and its concomitant opportunity to relegate to the United States the heavy lifting required to ensure its national security (Waltz 1993; Lind 2004). Offensive realists posit that with the decline of US hegemony and security guarantees, and facing the new security threat from a rising China, Japan will inevitably be obliged to shoulder responsibility for its own security and will emerge as a formidable military player, thereby restoring the regional balance of power (Mearsheimer 2001, 372–77, 396–400). Defensive realists argue that Japan’s changing external security environment may not induce such drastic change in its security policy, given the United States’ continued presence in the region, the superiority of US and Japanese defensive weapons, and the geographical distance between Japan as an island nation and its potential adversaries. Hence, Japan may only need to adopt the role of a circumscribed balancer to make the minimal commitments necessary to the US-Japan alliance to maintain the balance of power against China; or it may increase its purely defensive capabilities while reassuring its neighbors about its military motivations; or again, it may be able to pursue its national interests through the mercantile realist use of economic rather than military power (Twomey 2000; Midford 2002; Heginbotham and Samuels 1998; Green 2001). Realism thus offers a rich menu of options for explaining Japan’s security policy, but all approaches are united by a belief that the international structure is the primary trigger for post–Cold War change.

The main counterperspective to realism has been that of constructivism, which locates the principal explanation for developments—or, as this perspective would often argue, relative nondevelopments—of Japan’s security policy at the domestic level. Constructivists argue that the primary drivers of Japan’s security choices are deeply embedded domestic norms, particularly pacifism and antimilitarism. These norms are diffused among policymaking institutions and Japanese society more widely, and lead to an ingrained resistance to the Japanese state’s use of military power for national security ends or for glorification of the military (Katzenstein and Okawara 1993; Katzenstein 1996; Berger 1993, 1998; Oros 2008). Constructivists contend that these norms are sufficiently strong to counteract international structural pressures, providing a high degree of continuity and resistance to the remilitarization of Japanese security policy—even to the point of its becoming an “immovable object” (Friman et al. 2006).

The second dominant debate focuses on questions of the degree of shift and fundamental trajectory of Japan’s security policy. The default position in this debate is that Japan continues to show no fundamental deviation from its postwar trajectory of the so-called Yoshida Doctrine, involving a minimalist set of military doctrines and capabilities for the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), avoidance of overseas military commitments, and sheltering behind US security guarantees (Samuels 2006; Takao 2008; Hagström and Williamson 2009; Midford 2011). In turn, Japan remains committed to nonmilitary security policy, such as that embodied by the conceptions of
Comprehensive National Security and Human Security. The challenge to this default position is the argument that Japan is now gradually shifting toward the trajectory of a so-called normal, military power, prepared to deploy military force for national security ends and in support of the US-Japan alliance, both in the East Asia region and globally (Green 2001; Hughes 2004; Hughes and Krauss 2007; Kliman 2006; Pyle 2007).

The third and final major debate revolves around question of the implications of any possible shift in Japan’s security policy for its own, the region’s, and global security. As articulated by Japanese government policymakers and their counterparts in the United States, the argument is that changes to Japanese security policy are to be encouraged because they are measured and appropriate as befitting an advanced industrial democracy and ally of the United States. Japan’s potentially shifting security policy is thus of benefit to regional stability (Cronin and Green 1999, 310–22; Osius 2002; Armitage and Nye 2007; Calder 2009). The opposing view from a number of Japanese commentators, but also vocal foreign and revisionist academics, is that Japan’s growing military activity signifies new dangers. Japan may be moving either unconsciously or consciously toward the recrudescence of militarism, or is becoming too entangled in US military strategy, and thus re-establishing itself as a destabilizing influence in the balance of power against regional neighbors such as China and North Korea (Hook 1996; DiFilippo 2002; McCormack 2007, 55–89; Hughes 2009).

19.2. Changes and Directions in Japan’s Security Policies

19.2.1. Japan’s Postwar Grand Strategy

Japan’s security policy for most of the postwar period has been governed by the Yoshida Doctrine, as broadly formulated by the conservative prime minister Yoshida Shigeru (1946–47, 1948–54). In the aftermath of defeat in the Pacific War, Japan remained embattled by a mix of international and domestic pressures on security policy. Internationally, Japan was faced with the threat of Soviet Communism in the Far East; the United States holding out the prospect for ending the Occupation and restoring Japan’s sovereignty in return for pledges to rearm and assist in the Cold War struggle; and continuing East Asian suspicions of Japanese militarism. Domestically, those to the right of the policy-spectrum called for large-scale rearmament and military autonomy to resist the encroachment of Communism, but met strong resistance from left-wing policymakers determined to maintain the principles of Article 9. Meanwhile, the parlous state of the Japanese economy imposed limitations on the pursuit of an assertive security policy.

Consequently, the Yoshida Doctrine in the immediate postwar period and ever since has plotted a politically and strategically expedient path for Japan through these
contending international and domestic pressures (Samuels 2003, 2010–11; see also chapter 8 in this volume). Japan under Yoshida committed to minimal rearmament through the eventual establishment of the JSDF in 1954, and to the simultaneous signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and US-Japan Security Treaty in 1951 (Weinstein 1971, 103–27). Japan’s choice for minimal rearmament satisfied US and conservative pressures for a greater national defense effort, while also reassuring East Asian neighbors and domestic opposition that Japan was not retreading the path of becoming a significant regional military power. Japan’s conclusion of the peace treaty enabled it to regain its independence, and the bilateral US-Japan security treaty initiated an implicit Grand Strategic bargain that helped to mitigate international and domestic pressures. Under the treaty Japan obtained de facto—and in the revised treaty of 1960, explicit—guarantees from the United States in return for its provision to the US military of bases on Japanese territory for the projection of power onto the East Asian continent. Moreover, the United States provided extended nuclear deterrence. To a large degree Japan was thus able to outsource its security concerns to the United States without the need for major rearmament, and thereby defuse immediate left-wing opposition over security issues. In addition, rather than expending resources on Japanese military development, the United States provided its security treaty partner with the economic dispensations of aid and access to markets to boost its development as a “bastion of capitalism” in the Cold War struggle (Hughes 2004, 21–23).

Japan’s commitment to the Yoshida Doctrine and alignment with the United States has not been uncontroversial or without strategic costs, what in international relations literature are referred to as the risks of abandonment and entrapment (Snyder 1997). Abandonment entails risk that the United States as a global superpower with wider ranging strategic interests than just the defense of Japan might overlook its security treaty duties, or even abdicate them entirely. Japanese policymakers during the Cold War were less concerned about abandonment due to Japan’s central position in assisting the United States to oppose Communism in East Asia and enable tripwire presence of the US military on Japanese territory. Entrapment, however, has long been a constant and greater fear, in that the United States might pursue policies that generate war in the region which Japan would be inevitably drawn into, or even pressure Japan to dispatch the JSDF overseas to support US-led expeditionary warfare (Hughes and Fukushima 2004).

Consequently, Japanese policymakers have moved with considerable caution and hedging in designing security policy. Since the 1950s Japan has strictly adhered to interpretations of Article 9 that its military force can only be exercised for the national defense of Japan’s territory, and thus Japan cannot exercise the right of collective self-defense to defend other states and even its US ally outside its immediate territory. Moreover, Article 9 gave rise to a range of other antimilitaristic prohibitions including: the 1967 Three Non-Nuclear Principles (not to produce, possess, or introduce nuclear weapons); the 1967 and 1976 bans on the export of arms and military technology; the 1969 National Diet resolution on the peaceful use of space, and the 1976 1 percent of GNP limit on defense expenditure (Oros 2008).
Throughout the Cold War Japan’s policymakers remained vigilant to avoid entrapment. Japan stayed determinedly out of the Vietnam War despite the participation of other US allies such as South Korea and Australia (Welfield 1988, 210–12). It encountered increasing pressures in the latter stages of the Cold War to increase burden-sharing with the United States to counter the expansion of Soviet power in the Asia-Pacific. Japan responded with a significant quantitative and qualitative build-up of JSDF capabilities, but it continued to hedge against entrapment by holding to the nonexercise of collective self-defense, maintaining that these dispositions were purely for the defense of Japan and US units operating in and around Japanese territory under Article 5 of the bilateral security treaty. Japan and the United States did agree under the bilateral 1978 Defense Guidelines that Japan would undertake greater responsibilities for Article 6–type operations to respond to regional contingencies (Graham 2006, 122–49). But Japan avoided serious planning to support the United States in regional contingencies, and the JSDF force buildup avoided integration with US forces for fear of entrapment (Keddell 1993).

Furthermore, in line with this caution on security policy, Japanese policymakers have often sought to deemphasize the role of military power in security in relation to more economically oriented conceptions of security. Japan in 1980 adopted elements of a National Comprehensive Security Policy, which stated the need—even in the midst of the Cold War—to respond to problems of economic and resource supply instability as potential sources of interstate conflict. Japan’s history of comprehensive and non-traditional security has extended into the contemporary period with the provision of large-scale official development assistance (ODA) to East Asian and other developing states, and increased reliance on the concept of Human Security, predicated on the need to mitigate the economic needs of individuals and societal groups in order to ensure state—and thus interstate—stability.

19.2.2. International Structural and Domestic Political Pressures for Change

In the post–Cold War period, Japan’s traditional pursuit of the Grand Strategy of the Yoshida Doctrine has been challenged by shifting international and domestic forces working for continuity and change. These have led to notable developments in the institutional framework for making foreign policies, as well as transformations in military doctrines and capabilities.

19.2.2.1. Global Security Challenges

The first set of international pressures facing Japan is global security threats, multiplied in their significance by US demands for enhanced military cooperation from its Japanese alliance partner. Japan’s security equilibrium was initially upset in the post–Cold War period by the outbreak of the Gulf War of 1990–91. Japanese policymakers found themselves unprepared to respond to the United States’ and the international
community’s expectations for a human contribution to the coalition war effort through the overseas dispatch of the JSDF for the first time in the postwar period. Japan encountered domestic political gridlock on this issue and defaulted to the provision of US$13 billion in economic assistance to the coalition: a very significant financial contribution, but one that was derided internationally as “chequebook diplomacy” (Inoguchi 1991). Stung by this international criticism and lack of preparedness to respond to such post–Cold War crises, Japanese policymakers initiated a search for a more proactive security profile. The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) was eventually able to dispatch minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in 1991 on a noncombat mission after the cessation of hostilities, and then to pass an International Peace Cooperation Law (ICPL) in 1992 to enable the dispatch of the JSDF on noncombat UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) (Woolley 1999).

The next major international shock to affect Japan’s security policy was the terrorist attack on US territory a decade later on September 11, 2001, and George W. Bush’s ensuing US-led wars in Afghanistan and then Iraq. Japanese policymakers again keenly perceived the need to demonstrate solidarity with the United States and rest of the international community in combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Midford 2003). Japan’s defense planners feared the risks of entrapment if they provided direct military assistance for the United States in these conflicts, but at the same time were also cognizant of the potential risks of abandonment if they were seen not to be forthcoming as a reliable ally; they were concerned that the consequences of this would affect US support in Japan’s growing regional security threats with regard to North Korea and China (Hughes 2004b).

19.2.2.2. Security Relations in East Asia and Other Regions

Indeed, at the same time that these new international security challenges and alliance pressures have been visited on Japan in the post–Cold War period, the regional security environment surrounding Japan in East Asia is perceived to have undergone considerable deterioration. Japan’s most immediate and direct security concerns in the post–Cold War period have been in Northeast Asia, focusing particularly on North Korea (see also chapter 22). The North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993–94 first alerted Japan’s leaders to the risks of the North’s nuclear ambitions as demonstrated by its brinkmanship and growing ballistic missile capabilities. Japan has been confronted since the mid-1990s by the North’s threat of around three hundred 1,300-kilometer-range Nodong-1 ballistic missiles capable of striking most of the area of Japanese territory, and North Korean tests of Taepodong-1 and Taepodong-2 missiles close to or over Japanese territory and airspace in 1998, 2006, 2009, and 2012. In addition, Japan has grown increasingly concerned at North Korea’s determination to defy the international community and to acquire nuclear weapons—as evidenced by its nuclear tests in October 2006 and May 2009—with the ultimate Japanese fear being that the North will eventually be able to combine its ballistic missile and nuclear capabilities to create a delivery system constituting a credible nuclear deterrence (Hughes 2009b; see also chapter 26 in this volume).
Meanwhile, Japan entertains even greater anxieties over China’s rise and its consequent military intentions and capabilities. The Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995–96 triggered Japanese awareness of China’s increasing willingness to project power in pursuit of its national interests. Thereafter, Japanese policymakers have watched with increasing concern China’s assertion of its territorial and resource interests in the East China, South China Sea, and the sea lanes of communication in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond to the Persian Gulf (Drifte 2003; Wan 2006, 31–43; Mochizuki 2007a; Manicom and O’Neil 2009; see also chapter 27 in this volume). China has expanded its maritime operations, as demonstrated by the constant dispatch of what it terms “research ships” and People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels into Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around the disputed Senkaku Islands south of Okinawa Prefecture. Japan-China tensions further north in the East China Sea have been intensified by overlapping EEZs and territorial claims to gas field resources. Japanese policymakers have further protested to China over the lack of transparency in its military budgets and buildup; and have been particularly concerned at its acquisition of modernized capabilities in the form of fifth-generation stealth fighters, large numbers of intermediate-range ballistic missile forces, diesel and nuclear submarines, air defense and antiship destroyers, and more recently an aircraft carrier (Bush 2010, 41–86; Hughes 2012a).

For Japan these rising regional tensions have been compounded by the alliance pressures emanating from the United States. Ever since the first North Korean and Taiwan Strait crises of the mid-1990s, Japan has feared that if the United States were to launch military actions, Japan could face demands to provide military support for its ally. However, entrapment concerns have invariably been accompanied by concerns of comparable magnitude over abandonment by the United States. During the first North Korean nuclear crisis the United States requested logistical support for its forces in the event of a crisis. But Japan’s avoidance of planning for Article 6 contingencies meant that it lacked any bilateral contingency planning, generating a crisis of political and military confidence in the alliance. Successive North Korean nuclear tensions and missile tests have led Japan to question its confidence in US security guarantees. The United States as a superpower with broad global security interests relating to nonproliferation has often appeared more interested in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue in its entirety rather than dealing with the more immediate ballistic missile threat to Japan; in general the United States has appeared far from implacable in deterring North Korean military brinksmanship. Furthermore, Japan has at times feared abandonment by the United States not only in relation to North Korean crises, but also in the face of rising Chinese threats. With its emphasis on access denial, China’s military modernization has raised concerns that the United States may no longer possess sufficient capability or the will to sustain the costs of intervention to protect Japanese territory and maritime freedom of navigation; or even that the United States might eventually reach a general strategic accommodation with China that would sacrifice Japan’s national security interests (Hughes 2011).

Meanwhile, Japan’s security concerns outside Northeast Asia have been of a lower order of military importance. Japan has managed to build relatively cordial security ties
with Southeast Asia, and has been preoccupied with problems of internal political unrest in these states and nontraditional security issues, such as maritime piracy, environmental destruction, and infectious diseases (see chapter 24). Further afield in Central Asia, the Middle East and Africa, Japan has entertained similar nontraditional security concerns and an interest in the stability of energy resources and raw materials (see chapter 29).

19.2.2.3. Institutional and Policy Changes

Japan’s new international structural pressures in the post–Cold War era have been mediated and translated into policy by a range of domestic actors and institutions, themselves undergoing change in reaction to shifts in the domestic and international political situation. The traditional low profile of Japan’s security policy and adherence to the Yoshida Doctrine was ensured in the Cold War period by reinforcing policy mechanisms and stances (Pekkanen and Krauss 2005). The larger political system generally supported status in security policy. After its foundation in 1955, the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) governed, with only one brief interruption in 1993–94, for the next sixty years. The mainstream “pragmatists” of the LDP broadly supported a minimalist defense posture and the US-Japan alliance in order to provide security during the Cold War, while the more nationalistic “revisionist” elements of the party were largely kept from power (Samuels 2007, 109–32). The pacifist-oriented party in opposition, the Social Democratic Party (SDPJ), forcefully opposed the LDP on issues such as proposed revisions of Article 9, the constitutionality of the JSDF, and the signing of the US-Japan security treaty. However, the SDPJ never seriously sought nor was able to challenge the LDP’s grip on power.

At the same time, the specific mechanisms for security policymaking reinforced the status quo. Japan in the postwar period imposed an elaborate system of civilian control to prevent the re-emergence of militarism. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) took the lead in devising security policy and was the gatekeeper for managing the US-Japan alliance. It helped with oversight of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), which was only assigned the role of an administrative rather than a policymaking agency, remaining under the control of the Prime Minister’s Office (Hughes 2004, 60–66). The JDA kept watch over the JSDF, ensuring that the military was strictly removed from involvement in decisions concerning national security strategy. Moreover, Japanese public opinion broadly supported the cautious security stance. It remained suspicious of the JSDF as a conventional military force, regarding its most active role as disaster relief management rather than national defense; and acquiesced in the maintenance of the US-Japan security treaty as the most effective means to guarantee national security.

In the post–Cold War period, however, these policy mechanisms and attitudes have begun to undergo radical change. The LDP managed to cling on to power for a further two decades following the collapse of the Communist threat in Europe and much of East Asia. Nevertheless, in this period the LDP’s traditional governing pathway increasingly declined in legitimacy, in most part due to its failures to prevent Japan slipping into economic malaise, but also because of its inertia in security matters. In its efforts to retain power, the LDP increasingly turned to its revisionist elements keen to instigate not just economic reforms but also a more dynamic national security policy and
strengthened alliance with the United States, the best known of these revisionists being Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō (2001–6). Similarly, the SDPJ’s rigid adherence to a pacifist stance for Japan appeared to be mismatched with new realities, and it eventually accepted the constitutionality of the JSDF and US-Japan alliance and entered into coalition governments with the LDP, but also gradually faded as credible opposition. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has instead arisen as the main opposition party, generally supportive of an active security role for Japan, the need to strengthen the US-Japan alliance, and enhanced multilateral security cooperation with the UN and regional neighbors (Hughes 2012b; Easley 2010).

Japanese security policymaking mechanisms concomitantly have begun to develop in the facilitation of a more assertive security policy. The Prime Minister’s Office has emerged as an improved coordinator of policy overall, especially when combined with a strong prime ministerial figure such as Koizumi (Shinoda 2007). The JDA was reformed as the Japan Ministry of Defense (JMOD) in 2007, attaining an equal role alongside MOFA in managing the US-Japan alliance in the Security Consultative Committee Meeting, or 2+2, involving foreign and defense ministers from both sides of politics. In 2006 the JSDF acquired a more integrated command structure with a new Joint Staff Office, and has increasingly been allowed to share in security policy planning with civilian bureaucrats and politicians (Hughes 2009a, 53–65; Oros and Tatsumi 2010, 27–46). Additionally, the Japanese public has become more sanguine over defense policy: it remains dubious over overseas military deployments, but nevertheless is willing to sanction these, especially if for UNPKO or if seen to contribute to international peace promotion (Dobson 2003; Midford 2011). The public has also ascribed greater legitimacy to the JSDF as a military force in general and in its role in territorial and regional defense, and raised its support year by year for the role of the US-Japan alliance as indispensable for Japanese security (Früstück 2007).

19.3. JAPAN’S SHIFTING SECURITY POLICY

19.3.1. Transformations in Military Doctrines and Capabilities

Japan’s defense doctrine and military power, influenced by the international and domestic challenges identified above, have shown signs of a potentially radical shift in the post–Cold War period. Since 1957, and in line with the Basic Policy on National Defense, Japan has maintained a strictly “exclusively defense-oriented” posture.” Japan determined that it would maintain only the minimum necessary JSDF force structure sufficient for self-defense: a stance reinforced by the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) and the JSDF’s Basic Defense Force (BDF), which limited the JSDF to the largely static defense of Japanese territory and eschewed power projection capabilities (Gow 1982, 56–77). However, the revised 1996 NDPO stated for the first time
that Japan would now seek to respond to any regional contingency that affected its own security through the smooth implementation of the US-Japan security arrangements. Hence, for the first time Japan was now beginning to grapple with the need for a broader regional security role, a development that was reinforced by the redefinition of the US-Japan alliance in the 1990s to improve cooperation for Article 6–type contingencies, as explored in section 19.3.3 (Hughes 2004, 67–76).

The 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) began to move further along the trajectory of implementing a proactive Japanese security policy. Reacting to the changing external regional security environment and the events of the so-called war on terror, the 2004 NDPG identified North Korea as a destabilizing factor for regional and international security. For the first time the NDPG stated that Japan should “remain attentive” to China’s military modernization, and emphasized Japanese global security interests “spreading from the Middle East to East Asia,” thereby mapping its interests onto those of the United States in the “arc of instability” in the war on terror (Ministry of Defense 2004). The NDPG further stressed the need for Japan to develop “multi-functional, flexible and effective” forces characterized by mobility and rapid-reaction capabilities, including power projection outside Japan’s immediate territory (Hughes 2011).

The 2010 NDPG has pushed for potential stepped changes in Japan’s defense doctrine. The threat from North Korea continues to be emphasized, but China’s military buildup is now considered a concern for the regional and global community. The 2010 NDPG formally abandoned the BDF as the last vestiges of Cold War planning, and instead adopted the new concept of a Dynamic Defense Force (DDF). The DDF is intended to enhance Japan’s ability to ward off territorial incursions and respond to regional contingencies, and to shift the weight of JSDF deployments southwards to counter China’s military buildup.

In terms of specific capabilities that reinforce the DDF, in recent years the JSDF has acquired significant defensive and power projection hardware. For example, the MSDF maintains a forty-eight-strong naval destroyer force, including Aegis-equipped destroyers for ballistic missile defense (BMD); amphibious landing ships; an expanded submarine fleet; 8,000-kilometer-range surveillance aircraft capable of patrolling deep into the South China Sea; and now light helicopter carriers. The ASDF is procuring its own BMD system, 6,000-kilometer-range transports, in-flight refueling; precision guided munitions enabling long-range airstrikes; and now the F-35A fifth-generation fighter with air defense penetration capabilities (Hughes 2011). It has also been observed that the Japan Coast Guard has been strengthened as a paramilitary force to help fend off Chinese and North Korean maritime incursions (Samuels 2008; Leheny 2006, 157–64; see also chapter 27 in this volume).

19.3.2. Legal and Constitutional Changes

Meanwhile, Japan’s policymakers have continued to push for changes in national defense posture and capabilities by challenging various antimilitaristic prohibitions.
In some areas, they have successfully breached prohibitions, as with Japan’s decision since the late 1990s to implement its own program for intelligence satellites, thus reconceiving the 1969 resolution on the peaceful use of space into a principle allowing for its defensive use (Oros 2008; Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu 2010). Similarly, in 2011 the Japanese government overturned its arms export ban and is now set to allow licensed export of military technology for humanitarian purposes and for international co-development of weapons systems. Japan’s nonnuclear principles have not been formally breached, although official government investigations in 2009–10 confirmed that since the 1960s MOFA has maintained tacit agreement with the United States to allow the transit of nuclear weapons through Japanese ports. Moreover, Japanese policymakers have refused to codify the nonnuclear principles into law, thereby allowing for the possibility of the acquisition of nuclear weapons for defensive purposes (C. W. Hughes 2007; L. Hughes 2007; Schoff 2009; see also Yuan’s chapter in this volume).

Japanese policymakers have increasingly tested the Constitution’s overarching constraints on the exercise of force for national security ends. Attempts for formal revision of Article 9 gained some momentum before the LDP’s fall from power in the mid-2000s, with the production of National Diet, LDP, and DPJ reports arguing for formal recognition in the Constitution of the JSDF and its national defense role and the need for stronger obligations for Japan to contribute to international security. In addition, procedures for a national referendum on constitutional revision were enacted in 2007. Nevertheless, the efforts for constitutional revision have been curtailed by the difficulty of requiring a two-thirds majority in both houses of the National Diet, and then a straight majority in a national referendum. Hence, Japanese policymakers have instead preferred constitutional reinterpretation as an easier route to enhance military flexibility, and in particular to exercise collective self-defense in support of the United States. In order to affect JSDF overseas dispatch to Afghanistan and Iraq, the LDP has thus used the Preamble of the Constitution, which emphasizes Japan’s duties to international society as a means to partially override Article 9. Prime Minister Abe Shinzō in 2007 initiated a Council on Reconstruction for the Legal Basis for Security that argued that Japan could exercise collective self-defense in support of the United States in cases of BMD and regional contingencies (Boyd and Samuels 2005; Hughes 2009a, 112–29).

Nevertheless, Japan has continued to hold the line on the exercise of collective self-defense, in part due to continuing fears of entrapment in support of the United States, and the residual attachment of the Japanese populace to the antimilitaristic sentiments of Article 9. Added to constitutional prohibitions, Japan’s security policy continues to be constrained by simple material considerations, with other demands on the budget for social expenditure ensuring the defense budget remains approximately within the specified limit of 1 percent of GNP (Hummel 1996; Hughes 2009a, 37–40).
19.3.3. Developments in the US-Japan Alliance and International Security Cooperation

Japan’s degree of commitment to the US-Japan alliance and other external security activities is another key measure of deviation from its security trajectory. The first rounds of changes initiated in the US-Japan alliance were designed to respond to regional security challenges. As noted earlier, the first North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993–94 pointed to the essential lack of military interoperability of the US-Japan alliance in dealing with regional contingencies due to Japan’s fear of entrapment and consequent refusal to investigate the range of support it might provide to the United States under Article 6 of the security treaty. However, following the North Korean nuclear crisis, and given further momentum by the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995–96, Japan and the United States began to fill in these gaps in bilateral cooperation through “redefinition” of the alliance (Funabashi 1999; see also chapter 38 in this volume). The US-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation underwent revision between 1996 and 1997, and resulted in Japan’s Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Surrounding Areas, known as the regional contingencies law. Japan for the first time operated under the revised US-Japan Defense Guidelines and this law specified the type of noncombat rear-area logistical support Japan would provide to the United States, such as the use of civilian seaports and airports, provision of food supplies, and medical assistance.

The second round of changes moved the alliance beyond a regional to a potentially global focus for military cooperation. Following 9/11 Japanese policymakers perceived that they needed to avoid the mistakes of the Gulf War and demonstrate solidarity with the United States through dispatch of the JSDF to support the US-led coalition in Afghanistan. Hence, in October 2001 the LDP government was able to pass in short order an Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and subsequent legislation that enabled the deployment of the MSDF to provide noncombat refueling support for US and coalition ships in the Indian Ocean between 2001 and 2009. In addition, the LDP passed an Iraqi Reconstruction Law in 2003 that enabled the dispatch of the Ground Self-Defense Force and Air Self-Defense Force to Iraq and Kuwait for noncombat reconstruction and transport missions between 2004 and 2008.

Japan and the United States then sought to push alliance cooperation further through the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) operating from 2002 onward, and culminating in the Security Consultative Committee’s (SCC) issuance of ‘Common Strategic Objectives’ for the alliance in February 2005 and a Roadmap for Realignment Implementation in May 2006. The strategic objectives essentially noted the ambitions of the alliance to expand its scope globally, and the roadmap looked to begin realignments of US bases in Japan to enable closer integration of the JSDF and US military, and for the United States to fulfill its larger Global Posture Review (GPR) strategy of enabling the flexible deployment of its forces from regional bases on a global scale.
The US-Japan alliance has thus progressed in terms of the integration of strategy and interoperability of deployed forces. Indeed, the increasing effectiveness of military cooperation was demonstrated by the US-led Operation Tomodachi in the wake of the 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and Fukushima nuclear disaster, which involved the mobilization of 20,000 US personnel working alongside the JSDF. However, Japan’s advancement of the alliance relationship with the United States has not been without tension. First, Japan has continued its hedging behavior against US entrapment, still only sending the JSDF on noncombat missions, predicated on time-bound separate laws prescribing each mission. Second, Japanese policymakers remain concerned about abandonment, often dissatisfied with the United States’ apparent inability to halt North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs, and in the longer term to provide security guarantees vis-à-vis China’s rise (Hughes 2004a, 126–38; Hughes 2009a, 79–89). Third, on a more local level, US-Japan tensions have rumbled on over the issue of US bases in Okinawa (Calder 2007, 166–75). The key showpiece of US-Japan efforts agreed to in 1997 was the construction of a Futenma replacement facility (FRF) elsewhere in Okinawa for the US Marines Corps’ air units. However, despite three different sets of plans considered by LDP administrations for an acceptable site, and the agreement in the DPRI for an FRF at Henoko, local Okinawa opposition to the facility and its consolidation of the US military presence in the prefecture has impeded the relocation.

Indeed, US-Japan alliance tensions intensified in the immediate period after the changeover from the LDP to the DPJ administration in 2009. The DPJ decided to withdraw the MSDF from the refueling mission in the Indian Ocean in 2009, regarding this as a hazardous stretching of US-Japan alliance cooperation outside the scope of the security treaty that lacked appropriate constitutional legitimacy. In addition, the DPJ administration declared its intention to revisit the FRF agreements, indicating the possibility of relocation elsewhere in Japan or even outside Japan. The US opposition to revisiting the FRF agreements caused major ructions in the alliance and the eventual downfall of Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio (Hughes 2012b). The subsequent DPJ prime ministers Kan Naoto and Noda Yoshihiko have adhered more closely to the bilateral alliance relationship and agreed to push ahead with the FRF agreement, not least because of rising tensions with China in late 2010 over the Senkaku Islands. Nonetheless, the US-Japan alliance is likely to continue to experience tensions even as it develops and strengthens. Japanese policymakers welcome the United States’ recent orientation to East Asia in security terms, but remain nervous over the United States’ extent of commitment in terms of materiel and political will to guarantee regional security.

Meanwhile, Japan’s other regional and multilateral options for security remain constrained. Japan has concluded a series of bilateral security agreements with Australia and India, as well as seeking to improve defense cooperation with South Korea. But the logistical nature of these agreements—modeled on agreements with the United States and its allies and partners—simply serves to reinforce Japan’s integration into US security strategy in the region, rather than providing an alternative. Moreover, Japan’s attempt to sign an agreement with South Korea in 2012 was derailed by lingering South
Korean suspicions of Japan’s colonial past and now growing military presence. Japan is an active participant in regional security dialogue bodies such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF; see chapter 34), but these are clearly only supplements to the US-Japan alliance (Yuzawa 2007; Hughes and Fukushima 2004). Japan has maintained a steady contribution to UNPKO, dispatching the JSDF on noncombat missions to Cambodia (1992–93), Mozambique (1993–95), Rwanda (1994), Golan Heights (1996–2013), East Timor (2002–4), Nepal (2007), Sudan (2008–), and South Sudan (2012–). However, Japan’s contributions to UNPKO are small in total number of personnel, and it has yet to lift the ICPL’s restrictions on the use of force to protect non-JSDF personnel in these missions. Japan’s other external military commitments involve the dispatch of the MSDF on antipiracy missions off the Gulf of Aden—including the construction in Djibouti in mid-2011 of the first overseas military base for the JSDF in the postwar period—which serve a further useful function of monitoring China’s maritime and resource ambitions in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Again, however, although this demonstrates Japan’s slowly growing appetite for JSDF overseas dispatch and a global security role, it is a relatively small effort compared to its concentration on the US-Japan alliance as the continued mainstay of its security policy.

Similarly, Japan’s devotion to comprehensive and Human Security notions of security policy (see chapter 33) is increasingly under question. Japan will certainly continue to argue for the need to deploy economic power in order to alleviate societal and individual economic impoverishment, which in turn can feed into intra- and interstate instability and conflict. Nevertheless, Japan’s intention is to help to stabilize and integrate neighboring states, and alleviate societal and individual poverty as a source of conflict. But Japan’s declining ODA provision places a constraint on the centrality of this type of civilian power role for Japan, while much of its leading diplomatic and policy energy in regard to security in recent years has been increasingly consumed by conventional notions of security.

19.4. Future Directions

The empirical analysis presented above helps to provide answers to the three key sets of debates relating to Japan’s security policy, with corresponding links to the overarching questions of this volume.

The first large Japanese question is one of the relative influence of international structure and domestic agency in orienting state strategies and policies. Japan’s security policy suggests—perhaps rather predictably—that both structure and agency carry weight in determining policy outcomes, and that a more eclectic combination of realist and constructivist approaches is required (Katzenstein and Okawara 2001; Kawasaki 2001; Izumikawa 2010). Japan’s entire postwar Grand Strategy of the Yoshida Doctrine has clearly been designed to navigate between the hazards of the international system represented by regional threat—on the one hand—and alliance concerns
of entrapment and abandonment—on the other—while also accommodating competing domestic interests and especially strong antimilitaristic sentiment. However, the development of Japan’s security policy in the post–Cold War period demonstrates that international structural pressures have been growing in importance relative to past domestic variables. Japanese concerns over North Korea and more so over the looming rise of China have not completely overridden domestic resistance to an increased militarized stance and its comparatively restrained response: the pace of change in security policy remains cautious and incremental—perhaps remarkably so given the scale of the security challenges faced by Japan. Nevertheless, Japan’s security policy in this period has clearly begun to shift in the face of these structural pressures. Such international pressures continue to be mediated through domestic policy processes, shaping policy processes and promoting representatives of the conservative right of the political spectrum in Japan. But it is now hard to imagine how Japan can wholly resist these external pressures, and it is these that dictate the overall trajectory of security policy change.

In terms of the trajectory and degree of that shift, it is apparent that even if seasonally the trend is not immediately clear, overall change is gradually increasing toward engagement with the US alliance. Japan is implementing substantial change in its national military doctrines and capabilities. The JSDF has shifted to a DDF posture and is acquiring increasingly formidable power projection capabilities. Moreover, although Japanese policymakers remain cognizant of the risks of entrapment and abandonment—so involving a considerable amount of hedging tactics and growing pains in the bilateral relationship over issues of bases and strategy—the JSDF is steadily deepening its integration with the United States’ regional and global military strategy. Japan is strengthening its ability to assist US power projection in the Asia-Pacific, and has shown a growing capability and propensity to embark on cooperative global military enterprises. Although Japan’s military stance remains comparatively constrained and defense-oriented, it has the considerable capacity to project defensive military power outside its own territory, or even offensive power if sufficiently threatened.

The final question on the implications of change in Japan’s security policy is perhaps harder to answer than those relating to its drivers and trajectory. In many ways literature defining the debate has been polarized. As demonstrated by the discussions regarding the importance of domestic norms and continued caution in military expansion, Japan is clearly not likely to relapse into prewar militarism. Japanese policymakers in the mainstream have every intention of behaving as responsible members of the regional and international community. However, it is also not the case that Japan’s current set of drivers and policy trajectory is incapable of posing concerns for regional security. Japan’s development of its security policy has clearly been driven increasingly by external pressures emanating both from the regional neighbors of China and North Korea, and from the United States as Japan’s ally seeking support for its continued regional and global military dominance. The extent to which policymakers have attempted to obviate the need for domestic discussion of Japanese military strategy and obscure the JSDF’s military buildup certainly raises concerns for the transparency
and democratic nature of these processes, and thus the predictability of Japanese security in the future.

Moreover, Japan’s increasing integration into the US security ambit raises questions for the overall shape of the regional security balance and infrastructure. The strengthening of the US-Japan alliance is touted publicly by Japan and the United States as the cornerstone of regional security and as a public good from which all states benefit. This contention is supported by the many regional states that welcome the stability provided by Japan’s security connection to the United States: an arrangement that moderates Japan’s security behavior, as well as helping to maintain a regional balance of power against potential challengers and against China. Conversely, however, Japan’s strong attachment to the United States raises questions about a possible imbalance of power viewed from the perspective of those outside the alliance. China is clearly anxious about the US-Japan alliance being used as the foundation of a US encirclement policy, perpetuating US military hegemony and acting as a source of future conflict amongst the three powers (see chapter 20). Similarly, the overwhelming attachment of Japan to the United States, the dominance of this bilateral alliance on the regional security scene, and the way in which it helps to preserve the US-inspired hub-and-spokes system in the region, poses questions about whether it is crowding out opportunities for multilateral, East Asian–inspired security frameworks in the region. Japanese and US policymakers will argue that the strong bilateral alliance is compatible with multilateral security, but the record to date shows that the majority of Japanese security energy has gone into maintaining the alliance: multilateralism has come a distant second.

Hence, in the final calculation, Japan’s security posture matters vastly to the international relations of the region. Japan’s choices regarding its national capabilities, and most particularly the US-Japan alliance, are indispensable for the United States to maintain its hegemonic presence in the region, for the region’s choices in responding to China’s rising power, and to the shaping of future regional security architecture. The current security trajectory of Japan suggests that it is moving in directions that will support US military domination, assist the United States in stifling alternatives to the US-inspired security order, and establish the potential for collision in Sino-Japanese security relations, and thus US-Japan-China relations.

References


